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Abstract 
 
In the prototypical accident report, specific findings, particularly those related to causes and contributing factors, are 
usually written out explicitly and clearly.  Also, the evidence upon which these findings are based is typically 
explained in detail.  Often lacking, however, is any explicit discussion, description, or depiction of the arguments 
that connect the findings and the evidence.  That is, the reports do not make clear why the investigators believe that 
the specific evidence they found necessarily leads to the particular findings they enumerated.  This paper shows how 
graphical techniques can be used to depict relevant arguments supporting alternate positions on the causes of a 
complex road-traffic accident. 
 
Introduction 
 
A typical format for an accident report consists of four main sections:  a factual narrative that lays out the sequence 
of events relevant to the accident and its investigation;  a section that describes the analysis that was conducted 
during the investigation; a list of conclusions about the accident, including attribution of causes and contributing 
factors;  and a set of recommendations for how to prevent similar accidents in the future (ref. 1).   Not included as 
part of the typical report is any explicit description or depiction of the (usually) complex arguments that tie the 
various parts of the report together.   Readers who are interested in understanding the underlying arguments must try 
to reconstruct the arguments on their own.  This paper shows how a relatively simple graphical notation can be used 
in this reconstruction to map out the causal arguments that are left implicit in most reports.  
 
Case Study: A School Bus Accident 
 
As a case study to illustrate the technique, we use the report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) about a school bus accident in Omaha, Nebraska, on October 13, 2001 (ref. 2).   The accident involved a 
78-passenger school bus carrying 27 children and 4 adults.  The bus entered a work zone lane shift on US Route 6 in 
Nebraska.  It was faced with another bus travelling in the opposite direction; there was no median separation and the 
accident vehicle departed the roadway to the right, striking a barrier on the approach to a bridge.   The accident bus 
then steered to the left momentarily before veering back to the right, and striking the barrier once more before 
impacting with a three-rail barrier between a guardrail and the concrete bridge railing.   The bus passed through 
these obstacles and rode over the bridge sidewall.  It rotated in mid-air and fell about 49 feet to land in a shallow 
creek.   Three children and one adult were killed. 
 
The NTSB report about the accident is relatively short, consisting of less than 100 total pages.  It follows the typical 
format described above.  The Conclusions section of the report lists 22 separate findings, and gives the following 
probable cause statement: 
 
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of 
the Nebraska Department of Roads to recognize and correct the hazardous condition in the work zone created 
by the irregular geometry of the roadway, the narrow lane widths, and the speed limit.  Contributing to the 
accident was the accident bus driver's inability to maintain the bus within the lane due to the perceived or actual 
threat of a frontal collision with the approaching eastbound motorcoach and the accident bus driver's 
unfamiliarity with the accident vehicle. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the failure of the traffic 
barrier system to redirect the accident vehicle. 
 
One member of the five-member Board, Vice Chairman Rosenker, was not satisfied with this probable cause 
statement; he issued the following dissenting opinion: 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20050214784 2019-08-29T20:50:40+00:00Z
I agree with my colleagues and the entire report with the exception of a portion of the probable cause. Our 
staff's proposed probable cause, correctly in my view, identified the primary cause as the accident bus driver's 
inability to maintain the bus within the lane due to the perceived or actual threat of a frontal collision with the 
approaching eastbound motorcoach. The majority of the Board instead attributes the cause to the Nebraska 
Department of Roads. While I fully support that there were significant design and other deficiencies with the 
work zone, they did not preclude the safe operation of vehicles through the work area, and the work zone 
accident history undermines ascribing primary cause to the Department of Roads. 
 
We chose this report for the case study for three reasons.  Firstly, the report is unusual in that one of the NTSB 
members dissented from the determination of the Board about probable and contributory causes, although he 
accepted all of the other findings of the report.  This means that the dissenter and the other members must have used 
different arguments to reach their final causal conclusions.  This difference provides an interesting test of the 
efficacy of our graphical technique for illustrating arguments.   
 
Secondly, this accident represents one of a large number of similar road traffic accidents that claim lives both in the 
United States and Europe (ref. 3).  Thirdly, the use of this case study is motivated by the observation that similar 
vehicles transport children across relatively large distances and on frequent trips so that the risk exposure to future 
incidents may continue to be correspondingly high and with similar potential consequences.  
 
Constructing a High-Level Map for Causal Arguments 
 
The first stage of our work was to describe a high-level structure for the arguments in the report.   We began by 
separating the probable cause statement (p. 83 of the report) and dissenting opinion (p. 85) into five individual 
propositions, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1— Summary of Causal Propositions 
 
Probable cause was the failure of Nebraska Department of Roads to recognise and correct the 
hazardous condition in the work zone created by the irregular geometry of the roadway, the 
narrow lane widths, and the speed limits. 
Contributing to the accident was the accident bus driver's inability to maintain the bus within 
the lane due to the perceived or actual threat of a frontal collision with the approaching 
eastbound motorcoach and the accident bus driver's unfamiliarity with the accident vehicle. 
Contributing to the severity of the accident was the failure of the traffic barrier system to 
redirect the accident vehicle. 
Dissenting probable cause: The primary cause (was) the accident bus driver's inability to 
maintain the bus within the lane due to perceived or actual threat of a frontal collision with the 
approaching eastbound motorcoach. 
Dissenting comment:  The majority of the Board instead attributes the cause to the Nebraska 
Department of Roads.   While I fully support that there were significant design and other 
deficiencies with the work zone, they did not preclude the safe operation of vehicles through the 
work area and the work zone accident history undermines ascribing primary cause to the 
Department of Roads. 
 
Our analysis then took a more detailed look at the arguments that supported or weakened each of these different 
propositions.   The following figures use an informal graphical notation to map out the relationships between the 22 
findings of the report (listed on pages 81-82 of the report) and the propositions from Table 1.   These graphs are 
based on the argumentation structures that were originally developed in the area of design rationale (ref. 3) to 
provide a graphical representation of the arguments for and against particular design options.  In this paper, we have 
extended the constructive use of these techniques to map out arguments that focus on the causes of failure in the 
design and operation of safety critical systems. 
 
Figure 1 maps the various arguments that support the proposition that the Department of Roads contributed to the 
probable cause of the accident.   We have deliberately chosen to adopt the simplest representation that we could 
devise.   Later sections will demonstrate that many causal arguments rely on a broad and diverse array of evidence.   
It was, therefore, important that any graphical overviews did not add unnecessary complexity to these already 
complex constructs.   
 
 
Probable cause: The failure of 
Nebraska Department of Roads to
recognise and correct the hazardous
condition in the work zone created by
the irregular geometry of the roadway,
the narrow lane widths, and the speed
limits. 
+ Findings 5. The roadway geometry in the work zone resulted in extremely tight
tolerances on driver performance, which may have been exceeded when the second
Norfolk bus and the accident bus approached the West Papillon Creek Bridge. 
+ Finding 6. Although it cannot be determined whether the driver of the oncoming 
Norfolk bus encroached upon or crossed the centerline, the narrowness of travel
lanes in the work zone relative to the space occupied by the buses left the accident
bus driver little room for error. 
+ Finding 7. The roadway geometry in the work zone created a visual phenomenon 
that caused the accident bus driver to perceive the oncoming Norfolk bus as
impinging upon its lane, regardless of whether it did or not. 
- Finding 9. Even though all witnesses traveling eastbound on U.S. 6 insisted that 
the motorcoach maintained its lane, most witnesses who were traveling westbound
insisted otherwise; therefore, it cannot be unequivocally determined whether the
Norfolk bus encroached upon the westbound lane, creating a potential collision 
hazard. 
+ Finding 10. The combination of the west lane shift on U.S. 6 and the 10.5-foot 
lanes and the crest vertical curve on West Papillion Creek Bridge presented drivers
with a complicated visual situation that could cause them to misjudge clearances 
and distances. 
+ Finding 11. The work zone speed limit was too high for existing conditions. 
+ Finding 12. Poor traffic controls and hazardous roadway geometry left drivers ill-
prepared to anticipate danger and to respond properly to any problems encountered.
+ Finding 13. The segment of U.S. 6 where the accident occurred required 
relatively “perfect” performance, especially by drivers of large, commercial
vehicles. 
+ Finding 14. The absence of a site-specific traffic control plan for the U.S. 6 
construction project allowed hazardous traffic conflicts to develop in several areas
of the project, especially on and near the West Papillion Creek and railroad bridges.
+ Finding 15. The decision to construct the lane shift near the east end of the West 
Papillion Creek Bridge and to allow a construction work area with no buffer space
on the south side of the West Papillion Creek Bridge created a hazardous geometric
condition that contributed to the accident. 
+ Finding 16. Because inspections of U.S. 6 required and evaluated by the Federal 
Highway Administration and executed by Nebraska Department of Roads
personnel were inadequate, several hazardous conditions either developed, were
left uncorrected, or both. 
+
-
- Dissenting statement: The majority of the Board instead attributes the cause to the 
Nebraska Department of Roads.   While I fully support that there were significant design and
other deficiencies with the work zone, they did not preclude the safe operation of vehicles
through the work area and the work zone accident history undermines ascribing primary 
cause to the Department of Roads. 
 
 
Figure 1 — Findings Related to the NTSB’s Probable Cause of the Accident 
 
As can be seen from figure 1, most of these findings are linked to the probable cause by arcs that are annotated with 
the ‘+’ symbol.   That is, the findings support the case for the Department of Roads’ involvement in the probable 
cause of the accident.   These include observations such as “+ Finding 12. Poor traffic controls and hazardous 
roadway geometry left drivers ill-prepared to anticipate danger and to respond properly to any problems 
encountered” and “+ Finding 16. Because inspections of U.S. 6 required and evaluated by the Federal Highway 
Administration and executed by Nebraska Department of Roads personnel were inadequate, several hazardous 
conditions either developed, were left uncorrected, or both”. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that some of the findings undermine the majority’s conclusion about the probable cause.   In 
particular, finding 9 in the report states that “Even though all witnesses traveling eastbound on U.S. 6 insisted that 
the motorcoach maintained its lane, most witnesses who were traveling westbound insisted otherwise; therefore, it 
cannot be unequivocally determined whether the Norfolk bus encroached upon the westbound lane, creating a 
potential collision hazard”.   In other words, it cannot be proven that the road characteristics caused the Norfolk bus 
to create a potential collision hazard. 
 
Figure 2 continues the analysis by summarizing the NTSB findings that relate to the contributory causes of this 
accident.  As can be seen, many of the insights from the investigation relate to the factors that may have influenced 
the drivers’ behaviour.  It is important to stress that the construction of these diagrams relies on the subjective 
expertise of the analyst.  Their development is not straightforward.  For example, many of the factors that influenced 
the driver stemmed from the operations of the Department of Roads.  Hence it can be difficult to determine whether 
a particular finding should go in either figure 1 or figure 2 or both.   The key issue here is, however, to provide an 
explicit representation of the argument structures that were developed in the aftermath of this accident.  These 
representations then provide a focus for further analysis.   Figure 2 does not include any contradictory or negative 
links because the dissenting opinions sought to raise the importance of the drivers’ involvement in the accident. 
 
 
 
Contributing to the accident: 
 
The accident bus driver’s inability to 
maintain the bus within the lane due to the 
perceived or actual threat of a frontal 
collision with the approaching eastbound 
motorcoach and the accident bus driver’s 
unfamiliarity with the accident vehicle. 
+ Finding 6. Although it cannot be determined whether the driver of the oncoming 
Norfolk bus encroached upon or crossed the centerline, the narrowness of travel 
lanes in the work zone relative to the space occupied by the buses left the accident 
bus driver little room for error. 
+
+ Finding 4. The accident bus driver’s unfamiliarity with the accident vehicle, 
which differed both in its perceptual demands and in its handling characteristics 
from his regular route bus, may have contributed to his inability to accurately judge 
the lateral distance to the guardrail, bridge rail, and oncoming vehicle and to his 
inability to properly steer the bus through the work zone. 
+ Finding 7. The roadway geometry in the work zone created a visual phenomenon 
that caused the accident bus driver to perceive the oncoming Norfolk bus as 
impinging upon its lane, regardless of whether it did or not. 
+ Finding 8. The accident bus driver’s behavior at the time of the accident was 
consistent with anticipation of a frontal collision. 
+ Finding 9. Even though all witnesses traveling eastbound on U.S. 6 insisted that 
the motorcoach maintained its lane, most witnesses who were traveling westbound 
insisted otherwise; therefore, it cannot be unequivocally determined whether the 
Norfolk bus encroached upon the westbound lane, creating a potential collision 
hazard. 
+ Finding 10. The combination of the west lane shift on U.S. 6 and the 10.5-foot 
lanes and the crest vertical curve on West Papillion Creek Bridge presented drivers 
with a complicated visual situation that could cause them to misjudge clearances 
and distances. 
+ Finding 12. Poor traffic controls and hazardous roadway geometry left drivers ill-
prepared to anticipate danger and to respond properly to any problems encountered.
+ Finding 13. The segment of U.S. 6 where the accident occurred required 
relatively “perfect” performance, especially by drivers of large, commercial 
vehicles.  
 
Figure 2 —  Findings Related to the NTSB’s Contributory Cause of the Accident 
 
The next diagram, Figure 3 provides an overview of the findings that support the argument that the failure of the 
barrier system contributed to the severity of this accident.   At this level of analysis, the findings all support this 
argument.  Again this is explained by the observation that the dissenting opinion does not take issue with the main 
conclusions about the role of the barrier system.   Equally, however, a more sustained analysis might examine 
finding 18 on page 82 of the report that criticizes the Department of Roads failure to maintain the barrier system.  It 
could be argued that such failures were symptomatic of wider problems in the management of the site. 
 
 
Contributing to the severity of the accident: 
 
The failure of the traffic barrier system to 
redirect the accident vehicle. 
+ Finding 17. Had the barrier system struck by the accident bus been repaired to its 
original design and strength, the bus would probably have been deflected back into 
its lane and its departure from the bridge avoided. 
+
+ Finding 16. Because inspections of U.S. 6 required and evaluated by the Federal 
Highway Administration and executed by Nebraska Department of Roads 
personnel were inadequate, several hazardous conditions either developed, were 
left uncorrected, or both. 
+ Finding 18. The Nebraska Department of Roads and the contractor failed to 
adequately maintain the barrier system on the northeast corner of the West 
Papillion Creek Bridge, as required by the construction contract, and this failure 
contributed to the severity of the accident. 
 
 
Figure 3 —  Findings Related to the NTSB’s Arguments about the Severity of the Accident 
 
Figure 4 extends our application of this graphical technique to map out key elements of the dissenting opinion that is 
a central feature of this accident report.   As can be seen, there are strong similarities between this diagram and the 
summary in Figure 2 that reviews the contributory causes of the accident.  This should not be surprising.  The key 
objective behind the dissenting opinion was to raise the prominence of the drivers’ role from a contributory to a 
probable cause and, arguably, also to downplay the involvement of the Department of Roads.   Figure 4 also shows 
an objection to the dissenting opinion which is based on the majority’s probable cause.   In other words, the probable 
cause stands as an objection to the dissenting opinion just as the dissenting opinion stands as an objection to the 
probable cause in Figure 1.   The diagram also illustrates some of the complexity in the arguments that are presented 
in this report by showing further dissenting arguments from Table 1 which contradict the probable cause and 
therefore support the dissenting opinion by arguing ‘The majority of the Board instead attributes the cause to the 
Nebraska Department of Roads.   While I fully support that there were significant design and other deficiencies with 
the work zone, they did not preclude the safe operation of vehicles through the work area and the work zone 
accident history undermines ascribing primary cause to the Department of Roads’ 
 
This initial analysis associated the findings from the NTSB report with the probable cause, contributory factors and 
dissenting statements.  For the sake of completeness, it is important to observe that a number of findings could not 
be linked to any of these issues.  The first set of findings that cannot be connected to these higher-level observations 
exclude a number of issues from further consideration.  These can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The accident bus driver was not impaired due to drugs, alcohol, or fatigue; further, neither the weather nor 
the mechanical condition of the accident bus contributed to the accident. 
 
2. Although not detrimental to the emergency response efforts on behalf of the accident victims, 
communications were inadequate and resulted in a less than optimal emergency response. 
 
3. The accident bus driver’s qualifications neither caused nor contributed to this accident. 
 
A further cluster of findings does not directly address the causes of this incident.  In contrast, they focus on the 
egress and rescue efforts in the aftermath of the accident.   They also include observations about the bus design: 
 
19. Because of the difficulties in identifying the passenger locations and orientations at impact after the roll 
and 49-foot drop, it cannot be determined whether improvements in the accident bus’s body would have 
mitigated the severity of the passengers’ injuries. 
 
20. Had the Seward School District conducted emergency evacuation drills and demonstrations for all 
students, the passengers’ ability to open emergency exits and evacuate the vehicle in an emergency would 
have been greatly improved. 
 
21. Some emergency exit levers and signage were obstructed and not clearly visible and may have hindered 
the evacuation of the bus after the accident. 
 
22. Had the rescuers received school bus extrication training, rescue efforts would probably have proceeded 
more efficiently. 
 
 
 
Dissenting Probable Cause: 
 
The primary cause (was) the 
accident bus driver’s inability 
to maintain the bus within the 
lane due to perceived or actual 
threat of a frontal collision with 
the approaching eastbound 
motorcoach. 
+ Finding  6. Although it cannot be determined whether the driver of the oncoming
Norfolk bus encroached upon or crossed the centerline, the narrowness of travel 
lanes in the work zone relative to the space occupied by the buses left the accident
bus driver little room for error. 
+ 
+ Finding 4. The accident bus driver’s unfamiliarity with the accident vehicle,
which differed both in its perceptual demands and in its handling characteristics
from his regular route bus, may have contributed to his inability to accurately judge
the lateral distance to the guardrail, bridge rail, and oncoming vehicle and to his
inability to properly steer the bus through the work zone. 
+ Finding 7. The roadway geometry in the work zone created a visual phenomenon
that caused the accident bus driver to perceive the oncoming Norfolk bus as
impinging upon its lane, regardless of whether it did or not. 
+ Finding 8. The accident bus driver’s behavior at the time of the accident was
consistent with anticipation of a frontal collision. 
+ Finding 9. Even though all witnesses traveling eastbound on U.S. 6 insisted that
the motorcoach maintained its lane, most witnesses who were traveling westbound
insisted otherwise; therefore, it cannot be unequivocally determined whether the
Norfolk bus encroached upon the westbound lane, creating a potential collision
hazard. 
+ Finding 10. The combination of the west lane shift on U.S. 6 and the 10.5-foot 
lanes and the crest vertical curve on West Papillion Creek Bridge presented drivers 
with a complicated visual situation that could cause them to misjudge clearances
and distances. 
+ Finding 12. Poor traffic controls and hazardous roadway geometry left drivers ill-
prepared to anticipate danger and to respond properly to any problems encountered.
+ Finding 13. The segment of U.S. 6 where the accident occurred required
relatively “perfect” performance, especially by drivers of large, commercial
vehicles. 
- Probable cause: The failure of Nebraska Department of Roads to recognise and
correct the hazardous condition in the work zone created by the irregular geometry
of the roadway, the narrow lane widths, and the speed limits. 
- 
- Dissenting statement:  The majority of the 
Board instead attributes the cause to the 
Nebraska Department of Roads.   While I 
fully support that there were significant 
design and other deficiencies with the work 
zone, they did not preclude the safe operation 
of vehicles through the work area and the 
work zone accident history undermines 
ascribing primary cause to the Department of 
Roads. 
-
 
 
Figure 4 —  Findings Related to the Dissenting Opinion as to the Cause of the Accident 
 
Previous paragraphs have shown how high-level diagrams, based on design rationale, can be used to map out the 
different arguments that are left implicit in typical accident reports.   In this instance, we have been able to show 
how various findings in the NTSB report can be used to support different arguments about the probable cause of the 
accident.  These arguments relate to the main findings in the report but also to a dissenting opinion, which focuses 
on the role of the driver rather than the Department of Roads.  The following paragraphs build on this analysis and 
look in more detail at the evidence that is presented within the body of the NTSB report. 
 
Constructing More Detailed Maps for the Causal Arguments in Accident Reports 
 
Figure 5 extends the analysis beyond the findings to look at the analysis that was presented to support the different 
causal arguments in the accident report.   In this case, the focus is on the analysis that supports the probable cause 
that was introduced in earlier sections; ‘The failure of Nebraska Department of Roads to recognize and correct the 
hazardous condition in the work zone created by the irregular geometry of the roadway, the narrow lane widths and 
the speed limits’.  As can be seen, from the diagram, we have omitted this prose and have retained a placeholder in 
order to keep the map to a reasonable size for this paper.   The numbers in parentheses denote the page number from 
which the text in the diagram is taken. 
 
The diagram expands upon the arguments that support a finding on page 81 of the report ‘The roadway geometry in 
the work zone resulted in extremely tight tolerances on driver performance, which may have been exceeded when 
the second Norfolk bus and the accident bus approached the West Papillon Creek Bridge’.    As can be seen, the 
argument supporting this finding can be traced back to three different strands in the ‘Analysis’ section of the report 
between pages 60 and 69.  The original finding is presented on page 81.   The first line of analysis cites the results of 
simulations to show that the driver of the accident bus would have had to perform a number of complex and accurate 
maneuvers to successfully pass the on-coming bus.   The second line of argument suggests that positive lane 
separation and medial barriers might have been used to mitigate the consequences of any diver ‘error’.   The final 
line of analysis combines two different observations.   These do not focus on whether it was possible for the two 
buses to have navigated the road layout but whether they could have done so at the speeds they were travelling.  
This argument builds on an estimated closing speed of 132 feet per second and the contention that such speeds 
would only have been warranted in situations where there were additional provisions to ensure adequate separation. 
 
 
+ Finding 5. The roadway geometry in
the work zone resulted in extremely
tight tolerances on driver performance,
which may have been exceeded when
the second Norfolk bus and the
accident bus approached the West
Papillon Creek Bridge. 
+ Analysis (60): Although the roadway might have been wide 
enough to permit the second Norfolk bus and the accident bus to 
pass one another on a straightaway, given the off-tracking, 
overhang, and turning radii characteristics of the two vehicles, it 
may not have been wide enough for either driver to maneuver his 
vehicle through the series of curves at the speeds at which the 
vehicles were traveling.  
+ Analysis (60): As the accident bus approached the guardrail 
and bridge, the simulation indicates that, if the right side of the 
bus was near the edgeline, the operator would have had to steer 
the bus to the left about 70 degrees to avoid striking the guardrail. 
The rear of the bus tracked inside the front by about 4 inches at 
41 mph. For the accident bus driver’s to avoid going across the 
lane and striking the second Norfolk bus, the accident bus would 
have had to track about 5 to 8 inches toward the guardrail. During 
this corrective right steer, the bus struck the guardrail and then 
the bridge rail. 
+ Analysis (68): While a posted speed of 45 mph might seem 
relatively slow compared to a freeway speed limit, at this location 
it means that the closing speed between opposing vehicles is 90 
mph or 132 feet per second. Although speed limits in work zones 
are generally determined by engineering judgment, various 
factors, such as roadway geometry, traffic density and type, 
recovery zones, and positive barrier separation must be 
considered when making these determinations. However, it 
appears that narrow lanes, the lane shifts, the absence of a 
positive barrier between opposing lanes of traffic, the absence of 
a buffer space between the construction activity area on the 
bridge, and the two-way operation of commercial vehicles were 
not considered in combination when NDOR assigned a 45-mph 
work zone speed limit to the U.S. 6 project.  
+ Analysis (69): A center barrier and positive lane separation 
reduce the likelihood of frontal collision when a driver loses 
control or makes an error in lateral guidance. Similarly, lateral 
barriers help to deflect vehicles away from hazardous roadside 
obstructions. In this accident, nothing was in place to prevent a 
vehicle from crossing the centerline of the narrow road or to 
assure drivers that oncoming traffic would maintain its lane. 
Probable 
cause: 
+ Finding  6.  
+ Finding 7.  
- Finding 9.  
+ Finding: 10.  
+ Finding 11.  
+ Finding 12.  
+ Finding 13.  
+ Finding: 14.  
+ Finding 15.  
+ Finding 16.  
+ 
- 
- Dissenting probable 
cause 
 
+
+
+
  
 
Figure 5 —  Findings Related to the NTSB’s Probable Cause of the Accident 
 
The key point here is that the graphical maps provide a high-level structure for the causal arguments that are 
distributed across many dozens of pages in the accident report.   Algorithmic or semi-automatic means of extracting 
these arguments can be developed. Although the diagrams presented here reflect the subjective views of the analyst,  
they provide an explicit representation of the arguments that are often implicitly embedded within the report.   They, 
therefore, provide a focus for further discussion and debate amongst investigators who might seek to challenge the 
arguments in an official report.   Hence, the technique might be used either within investigation teams to ensure that 
their findings are well justified or by other agencies, such as legal firms, seeking to challenge those findings.   
Additional diagrams could be developed for each of the separate findings within the report.  Rather than presenting 
any of these diagrams in this paper, we turn our attention now to further expansion of the arguments that underlie the 
dissenting opinion. 
 
Mapping Out the Arguments Behind a Dissenting Opinion 
 
Figure 6 shows how the analysis in the official report can provide an argument in favor of the dissenting opinion 
from the Vice-Chairman.   In this case, the overview shows how the dissenting opinion is contradicted by the 
majority view of the probable cause.   This, in turn, is supported by the observation that highway engineers have a 
responsibility to mitigate hazards, or ‘limitations’, that affect a representative segment of the population.  In 
contrast, the dissenting view is supported by the analysis that the ‘safe operation of many vehicles through the work 
area and the work zone accident history undermines ascribing primary cause to the Department of Roads’.   This 
initial analysis shows that much of the disagreement focuses on the problems of determining whether a 
‘representative segment’ was placed at risk by the various work zone hazards.  On the one hand the majority argued 
that the accident occurred and that faults could be identified hence there was a significant risk.   The dissenting 
opinion in contrast, looked at the number of previous road users who had not been involved in any incident and 
argued that other factors may have been better ascribed as probable causes rather than the road layout in isolation. 
 
 
 
Dissenting probable cause: 
The primary cause (was) 
the accident bus driver’s 
inability to maintain the 
bus within the lane due to 
perceived or actual threat 
of a frontal collision with 
the approaching eastbound 
motorcoach. 
+ Finding 6.  
+ 
+ Finding 4.  
+ Finding 7.  
+ Finding 8. 
+ Finding 9.  
+ Finding 10.  
+ Finding 12.  
+ Finding 13.  
- Probable cause: The
failure of Nebraska
Department of Roads
to recognise and
correct the hazardous 
condition in the work
zone created by the
irregular geometry of
the roadway, the
narrow lane widths,
and the speed limits. 
- 
- Concurring and Dissenting 
(VC Rosenker) (85):  The 
majority of the Board instead 
attributes the cause to the 
Nebraska Department of Roads. 
While I fully support that there 
were significant design and 
other deficiencies with the work 
zone, they did not preclude the 
safe operation of vehicles 
through the work area and the 
work zone accident history 
undermines ascribing primary 
cause to the Department of 
Roads (NDOR).
-
Analysis (70) According to NDOR, the 
“generic” traffic control plan chosen for this 
construction project had been in place since the 
project began in March 2000. 
Analysis (70) Generic traffic control plan was
insufficient to have incorporated a detailed 
geometric design for Two-Lane-Two-Way 
operation (TLTWO), including site specific 
elements such as lane shifts, or use of the south 
side of the West Papillion Creek and railroad 
bridges for construction work areas. + Analysis (67): If a 
representative segment of the 
population exhibits a particular 
limitation, highway engineers 
have the responsibility to 
mitigate that limitation through 
effective highway design.  
+
Analysis (70) the geometry of the tapers for the 
lane shifts met the guidelines in the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). 
Analysis (70) The reverse curve… and the 
10.5-foot lanes resulted in an awkward 
geometric condition that appears inconsistent 
with the MUTCD,104 which states, “Frequent 
and abrupt changes in geometrics such as lane 
narrowing, dropped lanes, or main roadway 
transitions that require rapid maneuvers, should 
be avoided.” This lane shift on a TLTWO with 
10.5-foot lane widths and little or no shoulders 
could cause drivers to have difficulty remaining 
within their traffic lane, and specifically, could 
cause them to encroach on the centerline  
Analysis (71) According to NDOR and its 
general contractor, the use of TLTWO “sort of 
evolved.” No consideration was given to 
construction of a temporary retaining wall to 
avoid the “lane shift” in the temporary two-lane 
roadway where the crash occurred.  TLTWO 
was not part of the traffic control plan, but part 
of a field application by NDOR’s construction 
supervisor and contractor. 
+
-
+
-
-
 
 
Figure 6 — Findings Related to the Dissenting Opinion 
 
 
The top-right rectangle in the argument sketch in Figure 6 shows that the Nebraska Department of Roads had 
accepted the ‘generic’ traffic control plan for the site.  This supports the dissenting argument that some thought had 
been paid to the safety of traffic through the work zone and that the design need not have precluded the safe 
operation of vehicles in the site.   However, this dissenting argument can be weakened by reference to the analysis in 
other parts of the NTSB report.  As can be seen in Figure 6, the generic traffic plan was deemed to be insufficient in 
the aftermath of the accident because it did not provide a detailed justification for the safety of Two-Lane-Two-Way 
Operation (TLTWO).   The TLTWO procedures were not mentioned in the plan because they ‘evolved’ during the 
work.   The bottom two rectangles in the previous diagram provide further analysis of the dissenting opinion.  This 
argument is supported by the observation that the geometry of the tapers for the lane shifts met the guidelines in the 
US Department of Transportation’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (1993).   However, this support for 
the geometry is again weakened by the observation that the reverse curve seemed to violate a more general 
requirement in the MUTCD to avoid ‘frequent and abrupt changes in geometrics’. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In the prototypical accident report, specific findings, particularly those related to causes and contributing factors, are 
usually written out explicitly and clearly. Also, the evidence upon which these findings are based is usually 
explained in detail. However, it can often be difficult to reconstruct the arguments that connect the findings, analysis 
and evidence.  Reports do not make clear why the investigators believe that particular lines of argument necessarily 
lead to the particular findings they enumerated. This paper showed how a simple graphical technique can be used to 
depict relevant arguments supporting alternate positions on the causes of a complex road-traffic accident. 
 
The diagrams presented in this paper seem to show that the balance of argument is in favor of the majority view and 
against the dissenting opinion.  Our work has, however, been limited to the official report.   It would, therefore, be 
very remarkable if we found in favor of a minority view.   Conversely, it is likely that if we extended the scope of 
our analysis beyond the contents of the official report that it would be possible to represent alternative arguments 
and evidence to support dissenting opinions.   Previous pages have suggested particular ways in which this might be 
done for our case study accident.  This extension to the basic approach hints at possible applications in the litigation 
that takes place in the aftermath of an incident or accident. 
 
We are not satisfied with the graphical notation that has been used in this paper.   To this extent, our work represents 
a first cut attempt to map out the arguments in accident reports.  There are numerous alternatives.   We have already 
mentioned that there is a host of graphical notations for representing design arguments.  Many of these stem from 
Toulmin’s work on alternate approaches to logic for reasoning about decision-making (ref. 5).   Other notations are 
based on ideas first developed for reasoning in legal cases (refs. 6, 7).  As we have seen, however, the arguments in 
accident reports can themselves be extremely complex and we are reluctant to introduce additional complexity by a 
more formal graphical notation unless the benefits can be shown to outweigh the costs in terms of readability and 
accessibility. 
 
One side effect of this work on this case study has been to refocus our attention on a central issue in accident 
investigation; the role of human responsibility.   The majority view in the accident report reflects the modern mantra 
of systemic failure.  In this view, the individual’s actions are largely shaped by their context.  The dissenting view, 
arguably, harks back to an earlier time when personal responsibility played a greater role in determining the cause of 
accidents and incidents.   The graphical analysis in this report provides important tools for representing the two sides 
of a controversy that continues to this day. 
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